Federalism and The Modern Presidency From Eisenhower to Obama: If All Men Were Angels by Letendre, Daisy Chastain
Trinity College
Trinity College Digital Repository
Senior Theses and Projects Student Works
5-1-2013
Federalism and The Modern Presidency From
Eisenhower to Obama: If All Men Were Angels
Daisy Chastain Letendre
Trinity College, daisycletendre@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses
Recommended Citation
Letendre, Daisy Chastain, "Federalism and The Modern Presidency From Eisenhower to Obama: If All Men Were Angels". Senior
Theses, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 2013.
Trinity College Digital Repository, http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/352
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FEDERALISM AND THE MODERN PRESIDENCY FROM EISENHOWER TO OBAMA 
If All Men Were Angels…  
 
A thesis presented 
 
by 
 
Daisy Letendre 
 
to 
 
The Political Science Department 
 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for Honors in Political Science 
 
 
Trinity College 
Hartford, CT 
April 19, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________                  _______________________ 
Thesis Advisor          Department Chair
Table Of Contents 
 
Abstract 
 
Glossary 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Two 
Academic Interpretations of Federalism 
2.1 – Montesquieu 
2.2 – The Federalist 
2.3 – Daniel J. Elazar 
2.4 – Timothy Conlan 
2.5 – Paul E. Peterson 
2.6 – Vincent Ostrom 
2.7 – Conclusions 
 
Chapter Three 
Operational Federalism 
3.1 – Functional Federalism 
3.2 – Legislative Federalism 
3.3 – Managerial Federalism 
3.4 – Constitutional Federalism 
Table 1: Modern Presidents and Policies 
Table 2: Operational Forms of Federalism 
 
Chapter Four 
Case Studies of Sub-Experiments 
4.1 – Johnson’s Managerial Federalism 
4.2 – Reagan’s Legislative Federalism 
4.3 – Clinton’s Functional Federalism 
4.4 – Eisenhower’s Constitutional Federalism 
 
Chapter Five 
Conclusions 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
7 
 
 
10 
 
11 
14 
16 
18 
21 
23 
25 
 
25 
 
26 
27 
29 
31 
33 
34 
 
35 
 
35 
38 
42 
45 
 
51 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
  
 
Abstract 
 
American government is an experiment. It is theory in application based on a 
principle of design that specifies the terms and conditions of the experiment’s 
proper extent and structure. Federalism is the original design principle enumerating 
representation, divisions of power, checks and balances, and the capacity for self-
government as the terms and conditions of the experiment of the American 
Republic. In an extended republic federalism is the “republican remedy for the 
diseases most intrinsic to a republican government.” (Publius 1787-1788 [2003], 46) 
The experiment has continued for over 200 years although the terms and conditions 
have not always been met. In such instances, the extent and structure of 
government changes resulting in sub-experiments or operational forms of 
federalism. Modern government is increasingly characterized by the centralization 
of authority to the national government, especially to the president. By observing 
modern presidential administrations it appears that each fits into one of four 
categories of operational federalism: functional, legislative, managerial or 
constitutional. These sub-experiments and the associated administrations reveal 
operational realities of federalism that Hamilton and Madison could not have 
accounted for when they published The Federalist Papers in 1787-1788. Operational 
outcomes of the modern presidency from Eisenhower to Obama are not perfect. 
But to dwell on the diseases of our republican government is to let the diseases 
fester and affect our liberty and security. The American experiment is by principle of 
design equipped with the republican remedies for these governmental ailments. By 
reflection and choice we must remember the terms and conditions of federalism if 
we wish to reestablish good government.  
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Glossary 
 
Centralization:  
- The assumption of formal responsibilities by the federal government that states will not adopt or 
cannot adopt on their own. Federal assistance acts (supposedly) to re-enforce the administrative or 
policy-making powers of the state governments vis-à-vis the interests that lobby before them, 
supporting rather than interfering with them as civil societies.  (Elazar 1966, 34-35) 
 
- The effect of the modernization process and resulting economic interdependence which shift 
power away from state and local governments towards Washington. (Conlan 1998, 312) 
 
- Centralization occurs when power – scattered among a multitude of hands – becomes greater in 
one institution than in another. (Tocqueville [1835-1840] 2004, 92) 
 
Compound Republic: 
- The ordering of numerous associations that citizens constitute in local, state, regional, and nation-
wide activities of governance. (Ostrom 2008, 4)  
 
Confederation: 
- As the organizing principle of the Articles of Confederation, confederation implies the alliance of 
states. While confederation and federal are used for the same referent, Hamilton in Federalist No. 
15 and No. 16, is clear that a confederation does meet the minimal defining characteristics of 
government. (Ostrom 2008, 11) 
 
Covenant: 
- A partnership that unites separate parties without merging them. (Elazar 1966, VI)  
 
- The general agreement between several independent governments entering into a joint 
arrangement. (Ostrom 2008, 11) 
 
Decentralization: 
- When states decentralize power or transfer it to the national government the outcome is 
centralization or nationalization of power (Elazar 1966, 35) 
 
- The reduction of power, influence, and morale of the national bureaucracy. Also called devolution, 
decentralization’s focus is not on the improvement of intergovernmental management and 
effectiveness.   (Conlan 1998, 3) 
 
Federal: 
- A federal system of government has reference to many concurrently existing governments having 
autonomous existence in relation to one another in a general system of government – not just the 
national government. When referring to the national government Ostrom capitalizes “Federal” on 
the assumption that such terminology has the characteristics of a proper name rather than a 
properly defined term. (Ostrom 2008, 12) 
 
- When used by Elazar, federal implies national. He discusses “state-federal relations” which implies 
the relationship between the states and the national government in the federal system.  
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- The term federal or “federal government” as used by Peterson implies national or “national 
government.”  
 
- Federal, as used by the Framers means the states or state government. Ambiguity arises because 
their promotion of federalism was in favor of a strong national government as compared to the Anti-
Federalists who wished to remain separate states under the Articles of Confederation. This 
definition of federal has led many to wrongly assume that federalism is then equivalent with pro-
states policy. 
 
Federal Republic: 
- A federal republic according to Montesquieu is confederate. It is the confederation of small 
democracies to form an extended republic. According to The Federalist a federal republic also refers 
to the confederation of states done so via the creation of a strong national government. Both 
Montesquieu’s confederate republic and Hamilton’s federal republics were efforts to constitute 
compound republics – the compound nature of federal republics requires what Hamilton refers to as 
a general theory of limited constitutions: limits to the prerogatives of each unit of government are 
to be maintained by reference to a general system of constitutional law. Montesquieu articulates 
the basic structure of a republic that is capable of maintaining liberty by using power to check 
power. (Ostrom 1994, 44-45) 
 
Federalism: 
- Constitutional choice reiterated to apply to many different units of government in a system of 
government where each unit is bound by enforceable rules of constitutional law. (Ostrom 2008, 22) 
 
- The mode of political organization that unites smaller polities within an overarching system by 
distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the 
existence and authority of both national and subnational political systems, enabling all to share in 
the overall system’s decision-making and executing processes. Federalism is a mode of political 
activity that requires certain kinds of cooperative relationships through the political system it 
animates. (Elazar 1966, 2) 
 
- Modern federalism no longer implies dual sovereignty but rather means that each level of 
government has its own independently elected political leaders and its own separate taxing and 
spending capacity. (Peterson 1995, 10)  
 
- The structure of intergovernmental responsibilities. (Conlan 1998)  
 
National:  
- The central center of authority in a system of governance with multiple centers. (Ostrom 2008, 19) 
 
Nationalization:  
- See Centralization (Elazar and Conlan) 
 
- In the absence of specific constitutional prohibitions the observed pattern in the exercise of 
governmental authority is a transfer of that authority to the national government especially to the 
office of the president. (Ostrom 1994, 116)  
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Non-Centralization: 
- The distribution of power among the several smaller centers of government united by partnership 
within an overarching political system. (This definition does not imply power away from or power 
towards but rather the powers among units of government.) (Elazar 1966, 2) 
 
Subnational: 
- Political systems that exist below the national level – state and local governments (Elazar 1966, 2) 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
After an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal 
government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United 
States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its 
consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare 
on the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the 
most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have 
been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to 
decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not 
on establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are 
forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If 
there be any truth in the remark, the crises at which we are arrived may with 
propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong 
elections of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the 
general misfortune of mankind. (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 1) 
  
In the paper that follows it is my hope to provide a comprehensive analysis of American federalism. 
Federalism is the essential and original design principle of the American experiment in government, 
providing the terms and conditions by which the experiment is to operate. These terms and 
conditions are offered by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in a compilation of 
papers called The Federalist. Federalism provides for an extended representative republic deriving 
its authority from the self-governing capacity of the people. It allows for the separation of powers 
and a system of checks and balances. When the terms and conditions are effectively met by the 
government and by the people, liberty and security are insured. Federalism is the republican cure 
for the “diseases most incident to republican government.” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 46)  
 History has shown that these terms and conditions cannot always be met, and yet the 
experiment still continues. The experiment takes on different operational forms based on a variety 
of factors. I base my observations and understandings about these operational forms of federalism 
on the work of Daniel J. Elazar, Timothy Conlan, Paul E. Peterson and Vincent Ostrom. These 
scholars study federalism in very different ways. Elazar approaches federalism from the states 
perspective and views federalism as a partnership or a covenant. Conlan (whose method of 
observation I most closely adopt in my study) studies federalism via intergovernmental relationships 
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but uses periods of government, like presidential administrations or Congressional coalitions to 
compare and illustrate changes in operational forms of the principle. Peterson addresses the fiscal 
element of federalism and how the exchange of funds is largely what connects units of government 
with each other and with the people. The exchange of funds determines the form of operational 
federalism because policy (reflecting the intergovernmental relationship at a certain time) requires 
money in order to be implemented. Ostrom’s work reconsiders the original terms and conditions of 
the experiment and seeks to explain where we have come up short. He explains the bureaucratic 
tendencies in our current administration of government and explains that the more efficient 
alterative would be to view all units of government and American society as shared communities of 
understanding.  
 After providing an introductory analysis to the academic interpretations I outline four 
observed operational forms of federalism. Like Conlan, I have chosen to look at operational 
federalism essentially as sub-experiments of the larger theory based on modern presidential 
administrations. The forms of federalism I observe are functional federalism, legislative federalism, 
managerial federalism and constitutional federalism. These sub-experiments do not change the 
original terms and conditions of federalism, they instead occur when the original terms and 
conditions are ignored or forgotten by any of the actors in the intergovernmental system. Because 
my study focuses on the presidency, I observe and assess the president’s role in such instances. I 
offer conjectures as to why each administration fits into certain categories.  
 To further explain my methods and assessments of each federalism sub-experiment I 
provide four case studies of presidential administrations and a more comprehensive assessment of 
the category of operational federalism each fits into. I look first at Lyndon B. Johnson and 
managerial federalism, then Ronald Reagan and legislative federalism, followed by Bill Clinton’s (first 
term) functional federalism. I conclude the case studies with that of constitutional federalism and 
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Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency. Each form of federalism has practical application in the modern 
American political system but because the first three categories overlook or ignore some of the 
original terms of conditions of federalism they also have consequences in the American political 
system. These consequences would have been considered by Madison as instances of republican 
disease. Federalism began as a theory untested in practice thus The Founders had no way of 
knowing if the experiment would work. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s constitutional federalism 
demonstrates that the terms and conditions of the original design principle can be met efficiently 
and effectively in the modern era.  
 Constitutional federalism, however, has not been seen in operation since Eisenhower. So, 
what does this mean for the future of the experiment? If Federalism’s terms and conditions are no 
longer important or applicable, what terms and conditions are? Are societies of [citizens] capable or 
not of establishing good government based on reflection and choice? I posit at the end of this paper, 
based on my observations and research, that the answer to the question of Federalist No. 1 is yes, 
we are capable of establishing good government and we have established good government. We 
have, however, forgotten that reflection and choice must be employed continuously in order to 
realize the terms and conditions that make republican government good in the first place. Perhaps 
my optimism is naïve, but the American experiment is tenacious. It has endured episodes of civil war 
and depression as well as episodes of peace and tremendous prosperity for over two centuries. The 
American experiment was unprecedented at its conception and continues to be unprecedented in 
its many achievements. The current circumstances of bureaucracy marked by strict partisanship and 
gridlock in American government are unfortunate and frustrating – but this frustration reinforces 
why the study of federalism is important. As the experiment continues we must remember the 
principle upon which it was designed and the terms and conditions this design establishes. American 
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government must not be considered only in light of its current ailments but rather in light of the 
remedies federalism equips us with.  
Chapter 2 - Academic Interpretations of Federalism 
 
Federalism is often understood (misunderstood) as the basic interactions between various 
units or levels of government in a unified system. The dictionary definition of federalism is no more 
specific; Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines it as “the federal principle of organization.” The 
term federal originates from the Latin word for compact or treaty, foedus. The federal principle of 
organization is therefore the “various conditions establishing permanent, friendly relations between 
the contracting parties.” (Encyclopedia Britannica) American Federalism provides the terms and 
conditions for the experiment of American government.  
The idea of federalism was first conceptualized by French philosopher Charles de Secondat, 
baron de Montesquieu in his political treatise, The Spirit of the Laws. Montesquieu’s notion of 
federalism was then adopted less than half of a century later by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay in The 
Federalist. The American vision of federalism found in The Federalist has become the prototypical 
academic understanding of the idea. The America of 1789 had a vastly different political climate 
than that of the late 20th century and today and yet the idea of federalism remains important.  
Elazar, Conlan, Peterson and Ostrom have all sought to academically define federalism and 
its modern variants according to varying times in American government. These contemporary 
understandings move away from a pure theoretical understanding of federalism and begin to 
explain its operational forms.  By assessing federalism in its original conception according to 
Montesquieu and The Federalist, we are able to use these authors to explain how and why 
operational federalism occurs in modern politics. 
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Chapter 2.1 – Montesquieu 
 
 In 1748 Montesquieu published his political treatise The Spirit of the Laws. His discussion of 
republican regimes contains the original conceptualization of federalism. The examination of 
republican government begins in Part One, Book 3 (Ch. 2) as Montesquieu bequeaths the basic 
principle of such a regime; “the nature of republican government is that the people as a body have 
the sovereign power.” When resting the sovereignty of a government in the collective whole as 
opposed to a king or a ruling class, Montesquieu admits that an additional element must be applied 
to the republic – virtue.   
When that virtue ceases, ambition enters those hearts that can admit to it and 
avarice enters them all. Desires change their objects: that which one used to love, 
one loves no longer. One was free under the laws, one wants to be free against 
them. Each citizen is like a slave who has escaped his master’s house. What was a 
maxim is now called severity; what was a rule is now called a constraint; what was a 
vigilance is now called fear. There, frugality, not the desire to possess, is avarice. 
Formerly the good of individuals made up the public treasury; the public treasury 
has now become the patrimony of individuals. The republic is a cast-off husk, and its 
strength is no more than the power of a few citizens and the license of all. 
(Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 22)  
 
In order for a republic to exist, he insists that the virtue of the sovereign – the citizens – cannot and 
must not be overlooked.  
 Virtue in a republic is simple; it is the love of the republic, it is patriotism. Patriotism in a 
democracy is as follows the love of democracy or synonymously, equality. In Part One, Book 8 (Ch. 
2) Montesquieu discusses the corruption of the principle of government; he explains that the 
corruption of the principle will almost always lead, in turn, to the corruption of the government. 
When the ruled think that they are equal with the rulers and wish to then rule themselves, the 
virtue of equality is corrupted.  To prevent this phenomenon a democratic republic must avoid two 
excesses. The spirit of extreme inequality must be avoided as it “leads it to aristocracy or to the 
government of one alone.” Extreme equality is also to be avoided as it “leads it to the despotism of 
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one alone, as the despotism of one alone ends by conquest.” (Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 113) A 
small democratic republic best guarantees patriotism and equality and avoids these excesses.  
A small democratic republic that fosters virtue in its citizens is, however, subject to certain 
fallbacks due to its small size. Conversely a large republic struggles to promote equality and 
patriotism. Montesquieu recognizes these flaws. “In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and 
consequently little moderation in spirits: the depositories are too large to put in the hands of the 
citizens; interests become particularized at first man feels he can be happy, great and glorious 
without his homeland; and soon, that he can be great only on the ruins of his homeland.” 
(Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 124) Since small republics best foster virtue and large republics provide 
security, Montesquieu posits a scenario in which the merits of each eliminate the associated vices.  
In perhaps the most exciting chapter of his treatise, which establishes the tradition of federalism, 
Montesquieu writes: 
 If a republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it is large it is destroyed by 
an internal vice…It is very likely that ultimately men would have been obliged to live 
forever under the government of one alone if they had not devised a kind of 
constitution that has all the internal advantages of republican government and the 
external force of monarchy. I speak of the federal republic. This form of government 
is an agreement by which many political bodies consent to become citizens of the 
larger state that they want to form. It is a society of societies that make a new one, 
which can be enlarged by new associates that unite with it.  (Montesquieu [1748] 
1989, 131 emphasis added) 
 
 The federal republic combines the love of virtue (patriotism and equality) in small republics 
as well as the forces capable providing security in the face of imperialism and conquest found in 
large monarchies. “This sort of republic [federal republic], able to resist external force, can be 
maintained at its size without internal corruption: the form of this society curbs every drawback.” 
(Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 132) The federal republic provides a republican cure for republican 
disease. “Composed of small republics, it enjoys the goodness of the internal government of each 
one; and with regard to the exterior, it has, by the force of the association, all the advantages of 
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large monarchies.” (Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 132) The spirit of the federal republic, facilitated by 
liberty and security, is moderation and peace. Federal republics – “united in a political confederation 
have given themselves entirely and have nothing more to give.” (Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 133)  
Montesquieu’s federal republic is the framework for the design principle of the Founding 
Father’s experiment of American government. The confederation of smaller republics to form a 
larger one, ruled both by one central government and their own internal governments, protects 
against societal forces and foreign powers. An additional feature provided for by federalism is the 
protection of the liberty of the sovereign. Liberty, defined as the right to do everything the laws 
permit, “is present only when power is not abused, but it has eternally been observed that any man 
who has power is led to abuse it…So that one cannot abuse power, power must be made to check 
power by the arrangement of things.” (Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 155) Checks and balances and the 
separation of powers are now two of the terms and conditions of the American experiment.  
Montesquieu’s Sprit of the Laws, while often overlooked in the study of the American 
founding, is crucial to understanding the history of federalism and its theoretical basis. 
Montesquieu’s federalism works threefold in protecting the state, fostering virtue and protecting 
the liberty of citizens. Half a century after the publication of The Spirit of the Laws, his idea of 
federalism would be tested. Madison in Federalist No. 47 would write that “the oracle who is always 
consulted on this subject, is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable 
precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying, and recommending it most 
effectually to the attention of mankind.” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 235) The Founding Fathers 
would employ federalism as the design principle for a political experiment never before seen, 
establishing an extended republic of continental scale.  
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Chapter 2.2 – The Federalist Papers 
 
 Between October of 1787 and August of 1788 Madison, Hamilton and Jay published a series 
of 85 papers promoting the new Constitution. The Federalist Papers, as they have become known, 
provided arguments in favor of the American extended republic. These papers exist as the most 
important work of American political theory, containing an exposition of the American republic and 
the principle of federalism.  
 In Federalist No. 10, Madison presents the American variation of Montesquieu’s federal 
republic. He argues that the representative republic proposed in the Constitution protects individual 
liberties from the threat of majority tyranny. The extended republic is the basis for the idea of 
American federalism establishing the principle of organization and the condition of representation. 
Representation allows a large republic to remain attentive to local circumstances without infringing 
upon personal liberty.  
 The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests 
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a 
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals 
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, 
the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the 
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
right of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for 
all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. 
(Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 45) 
 
This extent and structure is, like Montesquieu first noted in The Spirit of the Laws, “the republican 
remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican Government.” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 46) 
In the case of the American republic the republican disease is not a lack of political virtue, but rather 
majority tyranny. 
 American federalism establishes an extended commercial republic that provides the original 
design for the intergovernmental system. In Federalist No. 39 Madison explains that no other 
principle of organization “would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the 
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fundamental principles of the revolution; or with that honorable determination, which animates 
every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-
government.” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 181-182) Self-government, a condition of federalism, 
applies to citizens and to the units of government. Government authority derives from the capacity 
for self-government.  Authority flows directly or indirectly from the people to government where it 
is administered by persons holding office. Madison elaborates that “it is essential to such a 
government, that [authority] be derived from the great body of the society, not from an 
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 182) Self-government 
ensures that all citizens are active participants in the political process; since authority originates with 
the people the people reserve the right to change the terms and conditions of the experiment. 
 Self-government explains how the experiment begins and how the experiment is 
administered. The act establishing the Constitution is to be considered a federal (an act of the states 
–see glossary), not national, act; “the assent and ratification of the several states, derived from the 
supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people.” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 184) The 
proposed Constitution, however, is not strictly federal but rather a combination of federal and 
national.  
“In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary 
powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national: in the 
operation of these powers it is national, not federal: In the extent of them again, it 
is federal not national: And finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing 
amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly national.” (Publius [1787-1788] 
2003, 187)  
 
This combination of federal (state) consent with national organization is what defines American 
federalism at its conception. The people, through self-government, create a more perfect union 
organized and operated by states and a national government.  
 The experiment of American federalism continues but in the modern era political leaders 
are able to perpetuate sub-experiments via their policy and methods of implementation. 
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Contemporary scholars of federalism are able to draw conclusions from the operational forms of 
federalism they observe. Federalism in application provides situational accounts of the viability of 
the original experiment. As interpreted by the following scholars, sub-experiments of federalism 
begin at the national level of government, often according to the president. These patterns and 
changes in intergovernmental relations are what form federalism’s operational history and allow us 
to reflect on what works and what does not.  
Chapter 2.3 – Daniel J. Elazar 
 
Daniel J. Elazar, historian and professor of political science, looks at American federalism 
and its relationship with the American political system in his 1966 book American Federalism: A 
View from the States. He examines and explains how intergovernmental partnerships form the 
organizational basis of federalism. “If there is any single point the book tries to make about the 
American political system as a whole it is that the system is – or at its best, strives to be – a 
partnership, of governments and publics and individuals. Indeed, the federal principle, which I argue 
is the animating principle of the American political process, calls intrinsically for partnership.” (Elazar 
1966, VI)  The term “federal”, from the Latin foedus, “indicates that federalism is best conceived as 
the end product of a compact or covenant uniting separate parties without merging them – in other 
words, a partnership.” (Elazar 1966, VI) The most integral component of this partnership, according 
to Elazar, is the states – which he views as the “keystones of the American governmental arch.” 
(Elazar 1966, 1) 
 Elazar defines federalism “as the mode of political organization that unites smaller polities 
within an overarching political system by distributing power among general and constituent 
governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of both national and 
subnational political systems, enabling all to share in the overall system’s decision-making and 
executing processes.” (Elazar 1966, 2) The partnership he observes implies the distribution of power 
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among the several centers. This distribution of power, he admits, is often thought to be a 
mechanism for decentralization or a way to justify the movement of power away from the national 
government to the subnational institutions or states. But Elazar defines this phenomenon more 
appropriately as noncentralization. The United States would not exist as a political body without the 
states, nor would the states exist without the individuals and thus “in the noncentralized American 
system, there is no central government with absolute authority over the states in the unitary sense, 
but a strong national government coupled with strong state governments in which authority and 
powers are shared, constitutionally and practically.” (Elazar 1966, 3-4)  
  Federalism (as Montesquieu intended) implies that small states unite to form an extensive 
union.  In this union the states maintain some autonomy so as to represent the interests of the 
people while the partnership protects the nation as a whole from outside forces. When this 
partnership is put into practice it becomes more complicated due to the reality that there is 
“continuous involvement of both the states and the federal government in the same public 
concerns.” (Elazar 1966, 33) Elazar believes that because of this continuous involvement a majority 
unable to gain satisfaction at one level of government will take the issue to the next level. “Federal 
assumption of new formal responsibilities is most likely to occur when substantial majorities within 
a majority of the states have come to advocate or accept the necessity for a particular program or 
course of action which their governments will not adopt or, as is most frequently is the case, cannot 
adopt alone.” (Elazar 1966, 34) This phenomenon is the centralization of power toward the national 
government (also called nationalization). The power is not nationalized by the national government 
itself but rather by decentralization of powers by the states. Issues that are frequently nationalized 
in this manner are “unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation, water pollution control 
and major highway reconstruction etc.,” (Elazar 1966, 35) as they require assistance or funding from 
multiple levels of government. 
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 Elazar, in discussing the ever evolving partnership between the states and the national 
government, seeks to define the “new politics” or the politics of democratic government that 
emerged in the late eighteenth century. The “new politics” affects the state-federal relationship 
because the political process occurs via two noted political channels: territorial democracy, and the 
political parties. Territorial democracy affects state-federal relations because it postulates that 
American politics is formally organized around units of territories as opposed to economic or ethnic 
groups. This means that varying interests are embodied by the representatives from each state. This 
allows for a neutrality of territory and reinforces the fundamental basis for political representation. 
The party system also plays a major role, according to Elazar, in “maintaining the basic structure of 
American politics and basic American political values, including those of federalism.” (Elazar 1966, 
50) The party system exists, for the most part in-between the states and the national government, 
while their finances and power exist primarily at the state and local levels. Because the parties are 
responsible for the nomination and election of most candidates to state and national offices the 
party system has in many ways “become the organizing principle around which national and state 
politics have been able to develop…” (Elazar 1966, 50) Elazar’s observations about the “new politics” 
recognize that there exists outside forces that shape how the terms and conditions of federalism are 
met.  
 Elazar does not spend much time discussing the role of the president in the American 
federal system as his focus is for the most part on the partnership of the states. The role of the 
president, however, becomes increasingly important in the modern era when observing 
intergovernmental relations and various operational forms of federalism.  
2.4 – Timothy Conlan 
 
 Professor Timothy Conlan’s approach to federalism differs from Elazar’s. Conlan treats 
federalism as a matter of national policy making. Because of this more nationalistic approach, 
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different operational forms of federalism occur and categorize modern presidencies based on a set 
of explanatory factors. He categorizes presidential administrations according to the forms of 
federalism they employ, with particular emphasis on the Nixon and Reagan records on federalism 
policy.  
 Federalism has become a form of public policy or a “governmental response to outside 
pressures and demands.” (Conlan 1998, 20) Policies of federalism, whether centralizing or 
decentralizing, now seem to launch “a government-led search for solutions to government’s 
problems.” (Conlan quoting Lawrence Brown)  An administrations tendency to nationalize power 
away from the states or devolve power away from the national government effects operational 
federalism. Either way the authority shifts, the federalism policies that Conlan describes change 
aspects of the constitutional design.   
When Richard Nixon took office, he sought to streamline and restructure government at all 
levels. The policies of Nixon’s New Federalism are called “managerial”. The Nixon Administration 
attempted to reform intergovernmental relations so that “power, funds and responsibility flow[ed] 
from Washington to the States and to the people.” (Conlan 1998, 32) Nixon inverts the order of 
authority transfer as provided by the original design. The Nixon administration was inconsistent. 
Nixon sought to decentralize federal involvement in some traditional state and local 
fields – community development, education and man power training – and at the 
same time proposed a complete national assumption of the costs of income 
maintenance, on the grounds that a more uniform, effective, and equitable welfare 
system could best be achieved through greater nationalization.” (Conlan 1998, 20-
21)  
 
Nixon intended to streamline block grants, revenue sharing and welfare reform but his new 
federalism was unsuccessful. He intended to decentralize national power and yet because of his top 
town managerial approach he centralized policy and administration.   
Ronald Reagan’s presidency differed from the managerial federalism of Nixon. Conlan 
discusses Reagan’s push for deregulation and his administration’s hopes for revitalizing federalism in 
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its original form but he concludes that “for Reagan, strengthening federalism was an instrument 
rather than a policy objective in itself” and that “he resembled his more liberal predecessors by his 
willingness to sacrifice his federalism goals whenever they conflicted with other, more deeply held 
policy objectives.” (Conlan 1998, 211) Reagan stated in his first inaugural address that it was his 
intention “to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of 
the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal government and those reserved to the 
states and to the people.” (First Inaugural Address January 20, 1981) This reveals a 
misunderstanding of the terms and conditions of federalism on Reagan’s behalf; federalism does not 
imply that the power of the national government must be limited in order for the states to be 
powerful. What is implied by the design of federalism is that the ends to which the national 
government can act are limited while power is not limited but is based on the authority of the 
people.  
While Reagan intended to devolve power from the national government to the states he 
was ultimately unwilling to do so because it meant he would be unable to use his office to centralize 
other policies like education reform and affirmative action. Reagan overlooked the multi-
dimensional aspect of federalism and the need for balance, by “consistently defining federalism 
reform as a one-sided equation that reduced the federal role but did little to encourage the states 
and localities.” (Conlan 1998, 109) Conlan admits that policy affects modern federalism but it is 
possible for policy outcomes of an administration to differ from the perceived intent. The 
operational form of federalism of Reagan’s presidency is discussed further in Chapter 4.2. 
Federalism takes different forms based changes in the organization and relationship of 
intergovernmental units. The allocation of funds and services increasingly affects the 
intergovernmental relationship between national and state governments. With money comes power 
21 
 
and as a physically larger unit of government, the national government has more money and more 
power than states and localities.  
Chapter 2.5 – Paul E. Peterson 
 
Paul E. Peterson, in The Price of Federalism, responds to the disparity between a President’s 
personal conception of federalism and his administration’s operational federalism.  He presents two 
theories, the legislative theory of federalism and the functional theory of federalism. He elaborates 
on the role both the national and state governments play in each theory according to what he calls 
policies of redistribution and development.  
Legislative theory of federalism explains the observations Conlan made about the Nixon and 
Reagan presidencies. This theory assumes political incentives cause a president to do the wrong 
thing things and make choices that negatively affect other units of government. According to this 
theory of federalism the president “care[s] more about overall consequences [of federal programs] 
for the nation and less about the distributional consequences of these policies.” (Peterson 1995, 40) 
Peterson explains that federalism is more likely to change according to congress because Congress 
has the power to make laws and also because congressmen have a direct connection with state 
constituencies. Nixon and Reagan were unable to achieve balance in intergovernmental relations 
because of the conditions of legislative federalism.  
Peterson’s more optimistic alternative is functional federalism, which distinguishes two 
economic purposes of domestic government – developmental and redistributive. “Developmental 
programs provide the physical and social infrastructure necessary to facilitate a country’s economic 
growth” while “redistributive programs reallocate societal resources from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have-
nots’.” (Peterson 1995, 17) Functional federalism assumes that state and local governments take 
responsibility for their area’s physical and social development while the national government takes 
responsibility for the redistributive economic obligations. In 1995 Peterson asserts that the direction 
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of American federalism more closely resembled functional federalism. Functional federalism is more 
likely to occur if the President enjoys a period of unified government. (See Table 2.)  The Democratic 
103rd Congress and Democratic president Bill Clinton agreed on the legislative agenda and achieved 
many successes. 
 Peterson’s functional theory of federalism assumes that states provide development 
policies, building infrastructure for economic growth, while the national government allocates and 
reallocates resources according to need. Nonetheless there are diseconomies of scale and fiscal 
disparities in the public sector. To address these inequalities, “functional theorists typically 
recommend that national and state grants to local governments be designed to offset inequalities in 
local tax resources.” (Peterson 1995, 22) National grants to states and local governments can be 
either regulated categorical grants or block grants. Categorical grants are typically used for 
redistributive purposes while block grants – federal funding to be used at a state’s discretion – “if 
matched to some level of local or state expenditure, can not only stimulate local expenditure along 
appropriate lines but can also help offset disparity in local fiscal capacity.” (Peterson 1995, 23) 
Categorical grants, unlike block grants, are accompanied by rules to make sure funds are not 
diverted from redistributive purposes to developmental purposes.  Categorical grants allow the 
national government to ask the states for assistance with redistribution. 
 According to Peterson, the president plays a greater role in the sub-experiment of functional 
federalism. The President is constitutionally subordinate to congress: “The Constitution gives the 
President the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the United States, but Congress is given the 
authority to make these laws. The President may veto laws passed by Congress but Congress can still 
pass the law over the President’s veto by a two-thirds vote…The subordination of Presidents to 
Congress is ultimately established by the congressional power of impeachment.” (Peterson 1995, 
40) The President is most effective at making and implementing policy during a time of unified 
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government. Divided government often prevents the President from achieving his full legislative 
agenda. (See Table 2.) 
 As authority shifts towards the president and the national government, the terms and 
conditions like checks and balances, separation of power, representative rule and the capacity for 
self-government are overlooked. Vincent Ostrom attempts revisit to these conditions of federalism 
and explain their role in the modern political era.  
Chapter 2.6 – Vincent Ostrom 
Vincent Ostrom’s Political Theory of a Compound Republic is one of the most recent 
depictions of American federalism. His argument rests upon the concept of constitutional choice 
and the founding so as to “understand and reconstruct the theory that was used to design the U.S. 
Constitution.” (Ostrom 2008, 5) Ostrom urges American government to return to the notion of 
individualism and personal liberty. Hamilton sought to create a limited national unit of government 
that could operate concurrently with state governments based on the concept that individuals form 
the basic unit in all political institutions. (Ostrom 2008, 34) Governments, composed of individuals, 
are subject to human fallibility. Federalism is the best defense against human fallibility, majority 
tyranny and the oppressive nature of government.  
Ostrom makes four assumptions about the first principles about The Federalist tradition. 
First is “that the individuals are the basic units to be considered in the design of political 
institutions.” Second is that these individuals are self-interested and will look to enhance their 
personal relative advantages. Third is that humans are imperfect but have the capacity to learn and 
to maintain and modify their governments. And finally, political constraint is advanced “based on an 
assumption that that conditions of reason and justice, and conditions of social organization, depend 
on some form of political order.” (Ostrom 2008, 30) These assumptions frame Ostrom’s assessment 
of modern federalism.  
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Ostrom emphasizes that a distinction must be made between a constitution and a law 
before federalism can take an operational form. According to Madison, in Federalist No. 53, a 
constitution is “established by the people and unalterable by the government while a law is 
established by the government and alterable by the government.” (Ostrom 2008, 49) The 
government cannot redefine the terms and conditions of federalism because “if governments were 
free to define their own authority, there would be no incentive for them to impose limits upon that 
exercise of authority.” (Ostrom 2008, 50)  
Ostrom believes that the President’s policies and agenda are no more important than any 
other unit of government’s as “no single structure dominates.” (Ostrom 2008, 129) Similarly, the 
national government is no more important that the states. But he observes that as the experiment 
with constitutional choice continues,  authority is concentrated nationally and the system is 
dominated by the executive. The covenant or partnership that exists between the states and the 
national government less and less resembles a shared community of understanding as power over is 
now more important than power among.  
Ostrom warns that the nationalization of power creates greater “potential for congressional 
standards to become increasingly ambiguous.” (Ostrom 2008, 188) This ambiguity occurs when the 
national government attempts to regulate public goods or create laws that apply to all the people of 
the United States regardless of differing environments and cultures. Public goods like health care 
and education are “co-produced” meaning that they “require the interest and participation of the 
immediate beneficiaries of a service.” (Ostrom 2008, 188) These co-produced goods are what fall 
victim to ambiguity because Congress and the executive, involved in power politics, cannot 
“establish adequate standards of legislation that are appropriate to all matters of governance in a 
continental republic whose physical environments [vary greatly], and whose citizens represent the 
diverse cultures, languages and expectations of governance brought to the New World over more 
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than four centuries of colonization and immigration.” (Ostrom 2008, 188) Co-production relies on 
Ostrom’s  first principle – that the individual is the unit of the American political institution. His 
theory assumes that government at all levels can co-produce necessary public goods with their 
citizens via shared communities of understanding and best protect the people of the American 
extended republic.  
Chapter 2.7 – Conclusions 
 
 Federalism has changed from its initial academic conception in Montesquieu’s Spirit of the 
Laws to the operational forms it takes in today’s political system. It remains, however, that as long 
as the experiment of American government continues so will the terms and conditions established 
by federalism. In the chapters that follow I look at the modern presidency and various operational 
forms of federalism. I assess the degree to which each sub-experiment remains true to the original 
terms and conditions promoting liberty and fostering balance within intergovernmental 
relationships.  
Chapter 3 – Operational Federalism 
 
 The idea of federalism, first defined by Montesquieu in 1748 has changed with history. 
Federalism was adopted as part of the experiment of American government and is outlined in The 
Federalist.  Federalism accounts for the extensive republican structure of the United States as well 
as the terms and conditions of checks and balances and the separation of powers. As a core idea of 
American government, it is inevitable that as intergovernmental relationships change so does 
American federalism. My study of modern presidents, from Eisenhower to Obama, documents these 
varying intergovernmental relationships including the shift of power toward the presidency and the 
increasing influence of the President in the relationship between all units and levels of government.  
 Each of the eleven presidents in this study has attempted to implement an agenda that 
reveals personal or party preferences and also how they view American federalism. Each has 
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pursued policies to fit the political, social and economic climate but not all presidents have been 
successful in all regards. The policies of an administration determine intergovernmental relations 
and thus the form of federalism a presidency is categorized by.  
 In this section, I describe four categories (or operational forms) of federalism: functional 
federalism, legislative federalism, managerial federalism and constitutional federalism. Each 
operational form can be explained by particular political factors and specific policy objectives. Table 
1 below lists the modern presidents chronologically.  It also lists policies of each administration that 
help categorize the operational form of federalism. Table 2 below then lists the modern presidents 
according to their respective category of operational federalism based on patterns of explanatory 
factors.  
Chapter 3.1 – Functional Federalism 
 Functional federalism derives from Paul Peterson’s assertion that domestic policies serve 
two different economic purposes, development and redistribution. Developmental programs 
provide and create social and physical infrastructure and are more effectively undertaken by the 
states. Redistributive programs reallocate resources to those in need and are better undertaken by 
the national government. (Peterson 1995, 17) Functional federalism is the operational result when 
the administration recognizes the differences between redistributive and developmental policy and 
designs or acts upon policies accordingly.  Redistributive and developmental programs both require 
an exchange of funds – the former from the national government to states or localities based on 
determinations of need and the latter from the national government to the states that have 
requested funding for specific developmental programs. Functional federalism is subject to the 
Article One requirement that Congress approves the exchange of funds and so it occurs only when 
Congress and the President agree. Thus, functional federalism more frequently occurs during times 
of unified government. Unified government, when the same party controls the White House and 
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Congress, is the factor that best explains functional federalism as the operational outcome of a 
presidency. 
 Three presidents fit in the category of functional federalism and all held office during a time 
of unified government. John F. Kennedy, 1961-1963, was able to propose tax reforms and New 
Frontier legislation with the support of a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress. Bill 
Clinton, 1993-2001, enjoyed a period of unified government during the first two year if his 
presidency, 1993-1995, and pursued a “functional federalism” agenda allowing him to successfully 
pursue domestic economic policies and balance the budget. Clinton’s second term fits the category 
of legislative federalism (see Chapter 4.3.) Like Clinton, George W. Bush, 2001-2009, enjoyed unified 
government from 2003-2007 and, as a result, was able to pass a number of controversial and far 
reaching domestic programs, including the Patriot Act which expanded the police power of the 
national government and created the Department of Homeland Security, educational reform (“No 
Child Left Behind”) which expanded the federal role in public school instruction, and a generous by 
unfunded Medicare-Based drug benefit for senior citizens. (Conlan and Dinan, 2007)  
 It has been observed that functional federalism most often occurs when a president enjoys 
a period of unified government and is able to use this unity to expand presidential power as it 
relates to his policy agenda. Unified government, however, is a condition over which the president 
himself has no control. Just as the president is unable control which party is the majority in 
Congress, unified government does not guarantee functional federalism as the operational outcome 
of a presidency. Peterson presents an alternative to functional federalism which he calls the 
legislative theory of federalism.  
3.2 – Legislative Federalism 
 Functional federalism occurs when Congress and the President agree on policy objectives. 
Legislative federalism “thinks that the political incentives that shape the decision of policymakers 
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induce them to make the wrong choices.” (Peterson 1995, 39) Political incentives include, for 
instance, the pressures a president faces when seeking reelection. In these circumstances a 
president might promise certain policies or express a particular ideology in order to win an election 
or re-election. After winning the office policies or ideologies may be implemented that diverge from 
those original promises. The legislative form of federalism is also explained by periods of divided 
government, when the President’s party is not the majority party in Congress. This form results 
because a President may be unable to implement his agenda due to opposition from Congress.  
 There are four modern presidents who practiced legislative federalism. Ronald Reagan, 
1981-1989, faced divided government for the entirety of his presidency. President Reagan expressed 
explicit pro-federalism, pro-state beliefs and was able to move these beliefs through congress during 
his first year in office making strides towards the simplification of the federal system. After 1981, 
however, he struggled to maintain and build on these early successes. Reagan, seeking re-election in 
1984, promised to continue this small government crusade but because of the pressures of divided 
government was unable to make these promises a reality (Reagan’s presidency is discussed further 
in Chapter 4.2). George H.W. Bush, 1989-1993, also faced divided government and it eventually cost 
him his re-election. He assumed federal deficits left over from the Reagan years when he took office 
in 1989 and while, as a Republican, he would have preferred to cut spending in an effort to reduce 
the deficit, (Wildavsky 1991, 117) the Democrats in Congress badgered his administration into 
raising taxes instead. Bush had promised convincingly that he would implement no new taxes at the 
1988 Republican National Convention and so the tax increases of 1990 came as a surprise to many 
Republicans.  The pressures of dived government in this case of legislative federalism, cost Bush his 
re-election. Bill Clinton felt similar pressures to Bush as he sought to pass national health care 
legislation. Clinton proposed a bill in 1993 seeking nationalization of health care. It would ultimately 
be rejected when the party in power shifted from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1995. Our 
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current president Barack Obama, 2009-2015, so far fits the category of legislative federalism 
because of the divided government he has faced since 2011. Although it was unified government 
that allowed The Affordable Care Act of 2010 to pass (not a single Republican voted in favor of the 
legislation) he faces strong opposition from the Republican majority in the House as he seeks 
legislation regarding gun control, immigration and tax reform.  
 Legislative federalism, as made operational by the presidency, relies largely on the make-up 
of Congress.  Divided government affects the agenda a President is able to pursue by checking the 
power of the office. In some cases the power of Congress in an instance of divided government can 
cost the president his re-election. The next category of federalism, managerial federalism, can occur 
during divided or unified government but is best explained by the individual preferences and 
leadership style of the president.  
Chapter 3.3 – Managerial Federalism 
Managerial federalism is an operational form of federalism explained by factors outside of 
the partisan realm – by the character of the president himself.  The term managerial comes from 
Timothy Conlan in From New Federalism to Devolution, who uses it to describe the presidency of 
Richard Nixon based on Nixon’s administrative approach to the office. Managerial federalism occurs 
most frequently when a president has a particular governing style or way of running the office. This 
form may also result when presidents face pressures from leaders of their own party in Congress. 
Five modern presidents fit into the category of managerial federalism.  Lyndon B. Johnson, 
1963-1969, assumed office following President Kennedy’s assassination. Johnson’s presidency, seen 
as a response to many of Kennedy’s initiatives, employed a military-style of leadership. He faced 
pressures from his Democratic Party to resolve economic and social issues. Johnson’s resulting Great 
Society programs (discussed in Chapter 4.1 below) were unsuccessful.  Richard Nixon, 1969-1974, 
sought “to rationalize, reform, and restructure active governmental intervention across the broad 
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range of public functions and governmental levels.” (Conlan 1998, 20) Nonetheless Nixon was 
unsuccessful in shifting power back to the states because he employed a top-down approach. He 
faced Democratic majorities in Congress during his time in office which intensified the managerial 
approach of his administration. Gerald Ford, 1974-1977, like Nixon “wanted to decrease the size of 
government and reduce government spending and taxes…” (Miles 1997, 117) He faced pressures 
from his own Republican Party to restore its honor but ultimately Ford lost the 1976 election to 
Democrat Jimmy Carter. Carter, 1977-1981, looked to reorganize the federal government and “make 
[the bureaucracy, the health system, the welfare system, the tax system etc.] simple.” This political 
theory of comprehensive change, however, was overly simplistic. His desire for uniform policy 
meant that differences in population, area, need or performance could not be taken into 
consideration. Carter overlooked one of the most basic terms and conditions of American federalism 
– the notion of the extended republic.  “Comprehensiveness, in the sense of fundamental and 
inclusive change, often contradicts predictability and simplicity.” (Knott and Wildavsky 1977, 54-55) 
George W. Bush’s second term fits into the category of managerial federalism but because of slightly 
different explanatory factors. Bush, before his career as a politician, was a business man. His style of 
governing perpetuated a corporate management style in the White House. Additionally, Bush faced 
considerable pressure from his Republican Party which asked him to actively push for a 
nationalization of social conservatism via the presidency.  
 Managerial federalism is an unsuccessful operational form of federalism with respect to a 
president’s political and electoral objectives. Even more significantly, it overlooks many of the terms 
and conditions of original American federalism. In contrast to the shortcomings of managerial 
federalism is constitutional federalism which I argue to be the ideal operational form. Constitutional 
federalism (explained and named after original order found in The Federalist) is the operational 
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outcome of a presidency that effectively protects and perpetuates constitutional order according to 
the original design principles of American federalism.  
Chapter 3.4 – Constitutional Federalism 
 
Constitutional federalism is the form of operational federalism that occurs when 
constitutional order and the terms and conditions of original federalism, as presented by The 
Federalist are met. Only one modern president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961, made this form 
operational. In his Farewell Address to the Nation in 1961 Eisenhower summarized the appropriate 
constitutional order between the various departments of government so as to best protect and 
serve the people and the nation. In some respects he anticipates the shortcomings of legislative and 
managerial federalism by stating that in meeting inevitable crises “there is a recurring temptation to 
feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current 
difficulties.”  
Each proposal must be weighted in light of broader consideration; the need to 
maintain balance in and among national programs – balance between the private 
and the public economy, balance between the cost and hoped for advantages – 
balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance 
between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the 
nation upon the individual; balance between the actions of the moment and the 
national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it 
eventually finds imbalance and frustration. (Eisenhower’s Farewell Address to the 
Nation of 1961, emphasis added) 
 
Eisenhower recognized the potential threat to security and liberty that imbalance in government 
could create. He believed that the purpose of government is to ensure security and liberty for all 
citizens. These two virtues are what the American republic was created to protect. By creating a 
government of small states liberty is ensured and by confederating those small states into a larger 
republic security is ensured. Eisenhower is the last president to actively recognize this basic design 
principle of American federalism.  
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I discuss Eisenhower’s presidency in Chapter 4.4 of this paper as an example of the 
operational goal to which all presidents strive. In the Chapters immediately below I provide an 
examination of specific cases of operational federation, Johnson and managerial federalism, Reagan 
and legislative federalism and Clinton (first term) functional federalism. 
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Table 1: Modern Presidents and Policies with Potential Effects on Federalism
Modern Presidents Policies Producing Federalism Outcomes
1953 - 1961 Expansion of Social Security  
Dwight D. Eisenhower Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 
1961 - 1963 New Frontier Programs
John F. Kennedy Tax Reform
1963 - 1969 Great Society Legislation and the "War on Poverty"
Lyndon B. Johnson Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
Revenue Act of 1964
1969 – 1974 New Federalism 
Richard Nixon Creation of the Environmental Protection Agency
“War on Drugs”
1974 Health Insurance Reform
Clean Air Act of 1970
1974 – 1977 Creation of the Economic Policy Board 
Gerald Ford Abortion Rights to the States
1977 – 1981 Creation of the Department of Energy
Jimmy Carter Creation of the Department of Education
Deregulation of American Beer Industry and of Airlines
1981 – 1989 “Reagonomics”
Ronald Reagan Tax Reform Act of 1986
Decreased funding to Medicaid, federal education 
programs and the EPA
Increased funding to the “War on Drugs”
1989 – 1993 Raised tax revenues despite promising “no new taxes” 
George H. W. Bush 
1993 – 2001 Welfare Reform
Bill Clinton Balanced the budget
2001 – 2009 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
George W. Bush
2009 – 2017 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2008
Barack Obama Proposed Gun Control Legislation of 2013
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Table 2: Operational Forms of Federalism
Operational Form Explanatory Factors
Functional Federalism Divided/Unified Government Electoral Pressures Policy & Personal Preferences
John F. Kennedy Unified - D New Frontier
Bill Clinton (1st term) Unified - D (1993-1995) Balanced Budget
George W. Bush (1st term) Unified - R (2003-2007) Party Pressures 9/11 Policies
Legislative Federalism
Ronald Reagan Divided Re-Election Pressure "Reaganomics"
George H. W. Bush Divided
Bill Clinton (2nd term) Divided (1995-2001) Failed Health Care Bill
Barack Obama Divided (2011-2015) Re-Election Pressure
Managerial Federalism
Lyndon B. Johnson Unified - D Party Pressure Individual Preferences
Richard Nixon Divided Individual Preferences
Gerald Ford Divided Party Pressure
Jimmy Carter Unified - D Individual Preferences
George W. Bush (2nd term) Divided (2007-2009) Party Pressure Individual Preferences
Constitutional Federalism
Dwight D. Eisenhower Unified - R (1953-1955)        Perpetuation and Protection
Divided (1955-1961) of Constitutional Order
- Party Pressures: Pressures the President Feels from his party to pursue policies  perhaps alternative to what he himself prefers
- Re-Election Pressure: The pressure and desire, when seeking re-election, to win re-election
- Individual Preferences: A res idual categoryaccounting for a president's leadership style, personality or approach towards the office
- Divided Government: A period of time  that occurs when the Majority Party of the House or Senate  differs from the Party of the President
- Unified Government: A period of time that occurs when the Majority party of Congress is the same as the Party of the President 
- Functional Federalism: (Peterson: The Price of Federalism 1995)
- Legislative Federalism: (Peterson: The Price of Federalism 1995)
- Managerial Federalism: (Conlan: From New Federalism to Devolution 1998)
- Constitutional Federalism: An original idea based on the intergovernmental design outlined in The Federalist 
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Chapter 4 – Case Studies of Federalism Sub-Experiments 
 
 This chapter presents case studies of four presidents and four forms of operational 
federalism, managerial, legislative, functional and constitutional. These forms are operational sub-
experiments of the original experiment presented by Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist. Each 
sub-experiment is explained by differing situations of intergovernmental relations. I have chosen to 
examine the operational forms of federalism specifically via the presidency because of the recent 
power-centralizing trends in American government. I have chosen four presidents, Lyndon B. 
Johnson, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and Dwight D. Eisenhower as case studies of each operational 
form of federalism. 
Chapter 4.1 – Case Study: Lyndon B. Johnson’s Managerial Federalism 
 
 The operational outcome of Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency was managerial federalism, 
brought about by his desire for intergovernmental reform and his fight in the “war on poverty.” 
Johnson’s desire for reform also existed as a response to the initiatives of President Kennedy with 
which Johnson disagreed. Johnson’s policies and presidency as a whole served as an outlet for his 
military-style of governing and general self-loathing (Wildavsky 1991, 23). The Great Society 
legislation, which now defines Johnson’s domestic agenda as president, was his attempt to 
perpetuate New Deal programs and win the “war on poverty.” “Great Society programs 
supplemented the New Deal’s legacy of social insurance and economic regulation with a large dose 
of what opponents called social engineering, the melding and application of professional services 
and social science technology to solve society’s problems.” (Conlan 1998, 8) Johnson’s Great Society 
was unsuccessful as he sought to fight an unwinnable war. War is a state of conflict between armed 
actors and cannot be waged, or won, against a societal condition.  
 The Great Society program, Johnson’s agenda for Congress in 1965, advocated legislation to 
provide aid to education, Medicare and Medicaid and create programs to fight urban poverty. The 
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Great Society programs failed to achieve Johnson’s goals largely because of his hands-on managerial 
approach. “Johnson was ultimately unwilling to turn management responsibility over to his senior 
staff. And without his backing, efforts at systematic coordination became no more than false starts.” 
(Peterson 1989, 226) Aaron Wildavsky posits that there exist three doctrinal parties of government, 
each presenting a different vision for how government ought to be run, the party of opposition, the 
party of balance and the party of government. “The party of opposition is opposed to growing 
government; it is for increasing the absolute and relative size of the private sector.” The party of 
balance, composed of deviant wings of the major parties, seeks fiscal balance via increased spending 
and decreased taxation on the Democrat side (George W. Bush as a Republican exception) and 
decreased spending and increased taxation on the Republican side (Bill Clinton as a Democratic 
exception). Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency, however, pursued the party of government and 
attempted to create citizens who are employees of, producers for or beneficiaries of government. 
Those who pursue the party of government also view government as the solution to anything from 
energy to inflation to poverty. (Wildavsky 1991, 117) Under President Roosevelt the party of 
government found success as New Deal programs effectively used government to solve problems. 
Johnson’s approach with the Great Society was inefficient and unsuccessful because his style of 
management ignored the basic principle of checks and balances within government. 
Paul Peterson associates policy type with level of government. Peterson argues that the tax 
and fiscal posture of the national government makes it better suited to pursue redistributive policies 
whereas the tax and fiscal situations of state and local governments require that they pursue 
developmental policy. These policy arenas, when applied to Johnson’s Great Society, allow the 
observation of many of the program’s shortcomings and failures.  
To the extent that Great Society programs were concerned with reducing economic 
poverty as distinct from racial exclusion, the mechanisms they chose for addressing 
the problem were hopelessly inept…The underlying theory of many of these Great 
Society programs understood bureaucratic imperatives and group processes to be 
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the primary obstacle to local redistribution. It was thought that local government 
agencies administered a potpourri of uncoordinated services in haphazard fashion 
to a predominantly middle-class clientele…to redirect local services to the poor, the 
federal government needed to galvanize the political resources of low-income and 
minority communities. At the same time it was believed that the federal 
government could entice existing agencies into innovative programs by distributing 
grants to reform-minded applicants. In this way, a limited amount of federal 
resources would leverage much larger local resources in a redistributive 
direction…This theory assumed that cities operated under economic constraints 
that were no different from those under which the federal government operated. It 
assumed that the obstacles to redistribution were local elites, bureaucratic 
ineptitude, insufficient group formation in low-income areas and noncompetitive 
local politics. Instead of seeing that these were the symptoms of an underlying 
structural problem, Great Society leaders attempted to muscle local officials into a 
set of policies they could not afford. In the end the federal government only 
strained the New Deal coalition that had made possible the national commitment to 
Great Society reforms. (Peterson 1981, 213-214) 
 
Johnson’s zeal for reform in American social policy included an equally intense commitment to the 
execution of these policies through state and local governments. In 1965 Congress enacted twenty-
one health programs, seventeen education programs, fifteen economic development programs 
twelve programs to meet city problems, four programs for manpower training and seventeen 
resource development programs. Federal intergovernmental transfers to state and local 
governments increased from $7.7billion in 1962 to $41.7billion in 1973. (Peterson 1981, 86) And yet 
the disappointment, lack of cooperation, conflict and confusion of the Great Society stemmed from 
the fact that the “programs were federal programs formulated and financed by central departments 
but administered and executed by state and local governments.” (Peterson 1981, 85) The Great 
Society programs attempted to replicate developmental successes in redistributive programs. 
(Peterson 1986, 45)  
 President Johnson tried to manage all levels of government and implement programs that 
would effectively fix the domestic problems. This managerial approach overlooked the complexities 
of the American political system such as differences in tax and fiscal structures between the states 
and the national government as well as the differing economic, cultural and ecological situations of 
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cities. Great Society legislation confused state and local leaders as it did not “establish adequate 
standards of legislation that [were] appropriate in a continental republic whose physical 
environments [vary greatly], and whose citizens represent the diverse expectations of 
governance…” (Ostrom 2008, 188) Government managed from the top-down prevents power from 
checking power and leads to inefficient policy creation and ineffective policy implementation.  
  The scope of national government authority increased as a result of Great Society 
legislation. Johnson’s managerial federalism did not occur because of bad intentions but rather 
because he misunderstood the complexity of intergovernmental relations and the reform process of 
such. Managerial federalism, in this instance, failed in part as a response to party politics and part 
because Johnson maintained successful New Deal coalition programs ineffectively.   
Chapter 4.2 – Case Study: Ronald Reagan’s Legislative Federalism 
 
 President Reagan, remembered as an advocate of states’ rights, verbalized a desire to 
protect federalism in its original design. His statements in favor of reducing the scope of federal 
government and increasing the power of the states, however, did not match the federalism he made 
operational.  Ronald Reagan’s federalism, determined by re-election pressures and divided 
government, fits in the category of legislative federalism.  Like Johnson, Reagan also sought 
intergovernmental reform.  “The objective of the Reagan administration was simplification of the 
federal system: the federal government would assume full responsibility for some policy domains 
while the states would assume others. (Peterson, 1986, 5) Reagan’s presidency foundered politically 
as he was unable to achieve these reform ideals. He struggled to convince state leaders to assume 
fiscal responsibility for programs previously funded by the federal government. He did not delegate 
what the federal government would cease to have powers of and he left the states with no direction 
or instruction for powers they were to assume. According to Peterson, legislative federalism 
assumes that often “the political incentives that shape the decisions of policymakers induce them to 
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make the wrong choices. The national government takes on responsibilities it should best avoid. It 
imposes unaffordable tasks on lower levels of government.” (Peterson 1995, 39) Reagan’s 
federalism goals were lost in his 1984 reelection bid just as Peterson asserts that the president is 
more concerned with electoral consequences (reelection) than with policy itself. 
President Reagan took office in 1981 following the Watergate Scandal and the mediocre 
presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. Wayne Vallis, in The Future under President Reagan, 
summarized the tasks awaiting the Reagan Administration at this time. Vallis writes that all Reagan 
had to do was “turn around the vast American government and economy, reducing inflation and 
unemployment, enhancing productivity, stabilizing the value of the dollar, addressing our energy 
needs and at the same time remedying rapidly deteriorating foreign and defense policy deficiencies. 
Above all, President Reagan needed to restore a sense of optimism about America’s future, a sense 
that America had once again regained its lost vitality.” Reagan did not assume the office at a 
particularly calm moment in American history and while he did have many successful undertakings 
as president his federalism initiatives were not among them.  
If Lyndon Johnson’s presidency exemplified the policy activism of a party of government, 
Ronald Reagan’s presidency is example of a party of opposition.  Parties of opposition oppose the 
growth of government, and seek to increase the absolute and relative size of the private sector. 
(Wildavsky 1991, 117) A party of opposition looks to foster a citizenry that also seeks limited 
government.  Unlike Johnson who, through his management style, sought to streamline 
intergovernmental relationships by increasing the size and scope of government, Reagan’s “primary 
focus of management reforms was to reduce the power, influence and morale of the national 
bureaucracy rather than to improve intergovernmental effectiveness.” (Conlan 1998, 3) The context 
of the ideological federalism of Reagan appears in his first inaugural address. 
It is time to check and reverse the growth of government which shows signs of 
having grown beyond the consent of the governed. It is my intention to curb the size 
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and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the 
distinction between the powers granted to the Federal government and those 
reserved to the states or the people. (First Inaugural Address January 20, 1981) 
 
The administration’s agenda for minimizing the federal government’s role and influence included 
proposed budget reductions, tax cuts, personnel freezes, block grants and deregulation initiatives. In 
1981, his first year in office, he achieved many significant victories in this direction. That year federal 
income tax rates were cut by 25%, business taxes were reduced by an additional $50billion and 
federal spending for domestic programs was reduced by $35.2billion; nine new block grants were 
established, consolidating seventy-seven programs, and sixty-two additional programs were 
terminated. Additionally, new regulatory review procedures were instituted and various pending 
regulations were halted or amended leading the administration to claim that it had reduced the 
regulatory burden on states and localities by millions of work hours and by billions of dollars. 
(Conlan 1998, 96)  
While 1981 exemplifies successful federalism and intergovernmental relations, there exist 
differing views on Reagan’s overall approach to federalism. Was Reagan committed whole-heartedly 
to the broad principles of American federalism or was “federalism reform a Trojan Horse for 
Reagan’s plan to slash the federal budget and dismantle social programs?” (Conlan, 1998, 108) In 
truth, both views are partly right and underscore a basic ambivalence in Reagan’s views toward 
federalism reform. Altering the balance of power between the federal government and the states 
was an important goal of the president and his administration, but Reagan’s plans for doing this 
overlooked the multi-dimensional component of the American republic. The national government, 
specifically the executive branch, cannot simply decide that rule-making authority must be 
transferred – all actors in the American intergovernmental system (including the citizens) must 
exercise self-government in order to resort or implement an appropriate balance of power.  
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Far from being the hidden goal of a secret and contradictory agenda, cuts in federal aid 
were viewed as an important tool of intergovernmental reform because they lessened the influence 
and fiscal profile of the federal government. These cuts in aid did not increase the power of the 
states but rather left them in the lurch with no directions for how to proceed. “In sharp contrast to 
Nixon, Reagan consistently defined federalism reform as a one-sided equation that reduced the 
federal role but did little to encourage states and localities.” (Conlan 1998, 109) The long term 
failures of Reagan’s federalism reform initiatives serve to illustrate the limits of the president’s own 
personal commitment to the reform. “Whenever Reagan had to choose between the goals of his 
federalism agenda and competing budgetary and philosophical objectives, he consistently fell short 
of his federalism aims.” Herbert Stein, former Nixon economic aide has famously said that “even 
conservative governments don’t want to limit their power.” (Conlan 1998, 190) This aspect of 
legislative federalism overlooks an original condition of the American experiment – that the 
authority of government is derived from the people, not the government itself. It is the people 
reserve the right to alter the terms and conditions of American government. (Ostrom 2008 [3rd ed.] 
78) 
Reagan’s legislative federalism was successful in 1981, realizing policies promised despite a 
Democratic majority in Congress. After that, however, federalism and pro-state policies became 
nothing more than terminology he employed in order to gain reelection in the ’84 campaign. The 
smaller government message worked in winning votes but post-election was given less attention 
than other policy initiatives. Reagan’s presidency failed to simplify the federal system and 
strengthen state governments as promised. “Even if the Reagan partisans genuinely desired to 
return to a free-market system, their methods did not augur well for such a reaction. They focused 
not on institutional change but on altering the budget numbers, on getting income-tax rates down – 
particularly at the top bracket – and, with much less enthusiasm, on reducing governmental 
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spending. Number juggling is not the stuff of revolutions.” (Higgs 1987, 256) While the legislative 
federalism of Reagan is still viewed more positively than the managerial federalism of Johnson both 
forms of operational federalism failed to effectively protect and perpetuate the constitutional order 
of intergovernmental relations based on the federal principle of organization.  
Despite differences in party and policy objectives, President Reagan and President Clinton 
employed similar political tactics. Like Reagan, Clinton’s overall presidency fits into the category of 
legislative federalism but his first term, 1993-1997, corresponds better with the conditions of 
functional federalism. During Clinton’s first term his legislative actions and policy plans indicated an 
awareness of the authority and semi-autonomous nature of the states. Clinton and Reagan, both 
former governors, knew first-hand the state’s struggles in dealing with the national government. 
Nonetheless, Clinton, whose call for federalism reform was much quieter, was more effective at 
balancing state-national relations.  
Chapter 4.3 – Case Study: Bill Clinton’s First-Term Functional Federalism 
 
 Functional federalism, as discussed in Chapter 3 derives from Paul Peterson’s assertion that 
domestic policies serve two purposes, development and redistribution. Developmental programs 
are more effective at the state level while redistributive programs are more effective at the national 
level. (Peterson 1995, 17) Functional federalism is the operational result when a president and his 
administration recognize the relative advantages of pursing policy purposes at the more suitable 
level of government and design their agenda based on such recognition. Both redistributive and 
developmental programs require an exchange of funds – redistributive from the national 
government to states or localities based on need and developmental from the national government 
to states who have requested funding for specific programs or projects. As stated in Chapter 3, 
Functional federalism is subject to the Article One requirement that Congress approves the 
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exchange of funds and so it occurs only when Congress and the President agree. Thus, functional 
federalism more frequently occurs during times of unified government. 
 Bill Clinton enjoyed unified government from 1993-1995 and pursued policies that fit into 
the category of functional federalism. With help from Democratic majorities in Congress, Clinton 
was able to “expand the federal role of education, job training, law enforcement and economic 
development.” (Conlan 1998, 213) Clinton’s expansion of the federal role was sympathetic and 
understanding of the needs of the states, and during the initial years of his administration federal 
aid to state governments as a percent of total federal outlays increased by 36% (1990 to 1995). “By 
virtually every measure, federal aid to state and local governments increased in relative importance 
compared with what it had been at the end of the Reagan era.” Grant outlays in current dollars 
increased by 67% (1990 to 1995) and grant outlays in constant 1987 dollars increased by 45% (1990 
to 1995). (Conlan 118, 217) Clinton, a former governor and “new Democrat,” (as compared to his 
“tax and spend” Democratic predecessors) (Conlan 1998, 218) used the Democratic Congressional 
majority to pursue policy of benefit to the states. This is demonstrated by the increase in federal aid 
to the states during his first term.  
Federal aid was increased to combat crime, invest in education and grow the economy from 
a national platform but by approving state waivers to federal legislation, Clinton allowed states to 
retain some autonomy and decision making authority.  As Conlan asserts in Intergovernmental 
Management for the 21st Century:  
It was not chance that led former governors turned president to support waivers. 
Like Reagan, Presidents Clinton remembered [his] own desires for freedom from 
sometimes onerous federal requirements and the ability to tailor programs to their 
preferences. [He] also felt that waivers could be used to improve program efficiency 
and control expenditures. This is especially important in entitlement programs, such 
as Medicaid, that can grow substantially in the very times when state revenues are 
negatively affected by economic downturn. (Conlan 2008, 160)  
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The role that waivers play in functional federalism during times of unified government is interesting 
as they have the potential to work to the advantage of state governors as well as the president. 
“Waivers allow governors to take credit for major reforms from constituents and get special 
recognition from Washington…Waivers also allow presidents to pursue controversial policy goals 
without seeking approval from the often politically divisive and slow legislative process…Congress 
sometimes chafes under the idea of waivers – recognizing that waivers can very much change the 
nature of the program devised by Congress.” (Conlan 2008, 161) If a president is backed by a unified 
government he is more likely to receive approval from Congress to allow waivers from states. He can 
then implement his own policy goals and also allow states to best tailor policy to their needs. A 
president during a time of divided government is less likely to receive congressional approval 
allowing waivers from states. 
When Clinton became president, “he stalked the prestige of his office on a plan to complete 
the welfare state legacy of the New Deal and extend health insurance to all Americans.” (Conlan 
1998, 218) His presidency was successful in a sense because he was able to balance the budget and 
because much of his legislative agenda was efficacious. Nonetheless he failed to implement 
legislation nationalizing health care as he had intended. In 1995 when power shifted in both the 
House and Senate to a Republican majority (and remained that way for the remainder of the 
administration) many of Clinton’s legislative goals including national health care lost significant 
backing. Additionally, when power in Congress shifted to the Republicans in the 1994 elections “his 
pretensions generated recurring bouts of lawlessness as the bureaucracy tried to fulfill the 
president’s directives.” (Ackerman 2010, 37) Peterson calls functional federalism optimistic, as it is 
dependent on variables not under the president’s control. And while Clinton’s first term is 
categorized in the form of functional federalism, ultimately his presidency takes the form of 
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legislative federalism (as discussed in Chapter 4.2) due to the divided government he faced from 
1995-2001.  
The federalism outcomes of the Clinton administration and the administrations discussed in 
the individual case studies (see Chapters 4.1-4.3) provide snapshots of history allowing us to reflect 
upon how the idea of federalism has changed as a result of the modern presidency. functional, 
legislative and managerial federalism have practical benefits for the way American government 
works today but they depart in many respects from the principles of American government 
presented in The Federalist. The next chapter discusses the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
his practice of federalism which I call constitutional federalism. Constitutional federalism is so 
named because it reflects the original principles of the American Constitution as described in The 
Federalist. Constitutional federalism is efficient because of the way it effectively orders 
intergovernmental relations; it takes advantage of the unique capabilities of the various levels of 
government to provide and produce the public goods and services voters actually prefer. Federal 
systems of government can, after all, only be expected to work “when those who use 
instrumentalities of government also know how to make proper use of them.” (Ostrom 2008, 129)  
Chapter 4.4 – Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Constitutional Federalism  
The Modern Anomaly 
 
Defined in The Federalist as the part of the experiment of American government, federalism 
is the concept that accounts for the structural design of the republic. Federalism establishes the 
system of checks and balances and the separation of powers which both protect the republic from 
majority tyranny and ensure liberty.  Federalist No. 39 explains the basis of these governmental 
powers in the federal system – the authority of the people. “The assent and ratification of the 
several states, is derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people.” 
(Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 182) The source of power, however, does not delegate power. “In its 
foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of Government 
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are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national: on the operation of these powers it is national, 
not federal: in the extent of them again, it is federal not national; and finally, in the authoritative 
mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly national.” (Publius [1787-
1788] 2003, 187)  
 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1961, recognized The Federalist’s call for balance. 
“Eisenhower was a maintainer not an innovator; he brought the Republican Party into the postwar 
consensus – internationalism abroad, acceptance of the welfare programs at home – while 
maintaining domestic tranquility.” (Wildavsky, 1991) The 34th president to perpetuated and 
protected the appropriate constitutional order of intergovernmental relationships. Without 
maintenance there cannot be balance. To maintain is to recognize existing relationships; to innovate 
is to alter the balance between various intergovernmental actors. Eisenhower’s presidency fit into 
the category of constitutional federalism because he carefully considered the multiple units and 
actors in the American system of government.  
In order to understand Eisenhower’s commitment to the original Federalist principles I 
consider his legislative agenda. Prior to his inauguration, the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 
was passed. The act established standards to eliminate pollution. The act shifted power 
incrementally to environmental groups and allowed them to seek regulations and to pressure the 
national government to comply. These politically autonomous agencies sought rigorous national 
standards for clean water and strict and swift enforcement by the federal government. Eight years 
later in 1956 the Clean Water Act was up for renewal. The legislation now called for more federal 
involvement. The revised 1956 act, among other requests, solicited the federal government to 
provide grants to local communities for the construction of waste treatment plants. President 
Eisenhower rejected the 1956 act on budgetary grounds and because he felt it presented a threat to 
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independent local government. (Peterson 1989, 307-308)  The act, despite any perceived benefits, 
did not maintain the appropriate constitutional order.  
Eisenhower believed that there existed, in the whole system of politics, a principle of 
contradiction due to an inability of men to forego immediate gain for a long time good. In the 
instance of the Clean Water Act, the environmental groups or pressure groups pretended to a moral 
purpose that examination proved to be false. (Griffith 1982, 92) Eisenhower recognized the 
importance of protecting resources as well as constitutional order for generations to come.  
Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into 
societies future, we – you and I, and our government – must avoid the impulse to 
live only for today, plundering for, for our own ease and convenience, the precious 
resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our 
grandchildren without asking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage.  
We want democracy to survive for all generation to come, not to become the 
insolvent phantom of tomorrow. (Eisenhower’s Farewell Address to the Nation of 
1961, emphasis added)  
 
The notion that today’s political actions have consequences on the politics of tomorrow is often 
overlooked in favor of short-term and immediate gains. (Particularly by those who seek bold 
innovations and do so quickly because the opportunity presents via unified government or because 
party pressures force a quick fix to hot button issues.)  
Eisenhower’s corporate commonwealth body of thought represents an attempt to resolve 
the contradictions of modern capitalism to create a harmonious corporate society without class 
conflict, unbridled acquisitiveness and contentious party politics. (Griffith 1982, 88) His 
administration is characterized by a desire to better delineate state and national duties.  He believed 
in progress through compromise. (Griffith 1982, 93) During the 1950’s his administration advanced a 
broad set of grant reform proposals. “In 1954 Eisenhower endorsed grant consolidation legislation 
that covered several public health and social service functions, though nothing was enacted… He 
also established the Kestnbaum Commission in 1953 to undertake a comprehensive review of 
federal aid and intergovernmental relations as a whole. In 1957 he created the Joint Federal-State 
48 
 
Action Committee, whose mission was to simplify and sort our federal-state responsibilities.” 
(Conlan 1998, 24) The Eisenhower administration actively strengthened the bonds of trust between 
all levels of government.  
Constitutional federalism, unlike functional and legislative federalism, is characterized by a 
working relationship between Congress and the Executive whether the government is divided or 
unified. Eisenhower recognized the importance of this relationship and “was masterful in dealing 
with Congress. In the eight years of his Presidency his own party had control of the Congress in only 
two years, and then by the narrowest of margins. But this never proved an impediment to his 
legislative programs.” (Hoxie 1983, 606) The creation of the Interstate Highway and Defense System 
provides an example of just how effective Eisenhower was in dealing with Congress as well as state 
and local leaders. 
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 which created what we now call the Five Star 
Interstate Highway System is the most noteworthy domestic achievement of the Eisenhower 
presidency and is an example of constitutional federalism in practice. The Highway Act of 1956 was 
an undertaking by the federal government to build interstate highways in rural areas to make travel 
easier. In an address to a conference of state governors, Vice President Richard Nixon spoke on 
behalf of Eisenhower and explained how the program would solve the “penalties” of the nation’s 
current obsolete highway network. These penalties included the annual death and injury toll, billions 
of dollars wasted in detours and traffic jams, clogged of courts with highway-related suits, 
inefficiency in the transportation of goods and “the appalling inadequacies to meet the demands of 
catastrophe or defense, should an atomic war come.” (Weingroff 1996, 6)   
Eisenhower knew that the creation of the interstate highway system would solve these 
“penalties” and would stimulate the economy. (The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 produced 
enormous growth in the auto industry, trucking industry, oil industry, construction and engineering 
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industries) (Griffith 1982, 106)  In Eisenhower’s State of the Union Address to Congress in January of 
1955 he argued that “a modern highway system is essential to meet the needs of our growing 
population, our expanding economy, and our national security.” He continued, “This problem has 
been carefully considered by the Conference of State Governors and by a special Advisory 
Committee on a National Highway Program, composed of leading private citizens.”  Eisenhower did 
not hope to expand his own power or the power of the presidency but rather created effective 
policy by involving actors from all levels of government.  
The main controversy surrounding the funding of the act involved the apportionment of 
funds to states and localities. “Heavily populated states and urban areas wanted population to be 
the main factor, while other states preferred land area and distance as factors.” $175 million 
authorized for the interstate system in the 1954 bill was to be distributed based on a 60-40 ratio, 
representing a compromise: one-half based on population and one-half based on the federal-aid 
primary formula (one-third on roadway distance, one-third on land area and one-third on 
population.) (Weingroff 1996, 6) Later in June of 1955 Eisenhower discussed financing the project in 
The President’s News Conference to Milton R. Freudenheim from the Akron Beacon Journal: 
Now, the question of financing raises problems. Either you must find some way to 
finance these things out of current revenues as you go along, which means very 
greatly increased taxes, and in this case that would be on related products, gasoline, 
tires, and so on, or you must find some method of having a bond issue. If you had 
the bond issue, then you have the problem: do you want to add it to the national 
debt of do you want to put it under a special organization in which liquidation is 
provided for, and which will get this whole sum of debt off out books as rapidly as 
possible. The Governors of the United States, and the Clay Committee which I had 
appointed, in cooperation developed a plan that made road building, plus a bond 
issue which would be liquidating, under a U.S. Corporation. Now, here is one of the 
reasons against just raising taxes and trying to do it in that way, getting in a lot of 
revenue and building that much each year: where are the States going to get the 
money to do their part of this thing? It seems to me that we have got to recognize 
occasionally the very great responsibility, authority, and power that should reside in 
our States, allowing them to have the decent sources of revenue. (The President’s 
News Conference of June 29, 1955) 
 
50 
 
Recognizing the “great responsibility, authority and power that should reside in our States” is an 
invocation for constitutional federalism recalling the state’s close proximately to the people from 
whom the power of government derives. The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 is an example of 
successful operational federalism: the intended results match the actual outcomes. “The interstate 
system has encouraged an unprecedented democratization of mobility. It has opened up access to 
an array of goods and services previously unavailable to many and created massive opportunities for 
five decades and three generations of Americans. It made the country more accessible to itself while 
also making it safer and more secure…” (Snyder 2006) The original principles of federalism exist to 
ensure liberty while maintaining security; these principles are made operational via the Interstate 
Highway Act of 1956. 
Eisenhower explains in his Farewell Address to the Nation in 1961 that “We should take 
nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of 
the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that 
security and liberty may prosper together.” (Eisenhower’s Farewell Address to the Nation of 1961, 
emphasis added) The protection of security and liberty is the original basis for the confederate 
republic as conceived by Montesquieu and adopted by the authors of The Federalist.  
If a republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it is large, it is destroyed by 
internal vice. Thus it is very likely that ultimately men would have been obliged to 
live forever under the government of [democracy or aristocracy] alone if they had 
not devised a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a 
republican government and the external force of a monarchy. I speak of the federal 
republic. This form of government is an agreement by which many political bodies 
consent to become citizens of the larger state that they want to form. It is a society 
of societies that make a new one, which can be enlarged by new associates that 
unite with it.” (Montesquieu [1748] 1989, 131 emphasis added) 
 
The modern presidency since Eisenhower has left the people afflicted by the “fatal combination of 
helplessness envy and greed created by the gradual appeals of politicians in seeking to win 
reelections and form winning coalitions.” (Ostrom 2008, 17) In order for the American experiment of 
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federalism to endure we must take Eisenhower’s approach as an example and reapply the original 
terms and conditions to the modern political environment.  
Chapter 5 – Conclusions 
 
American federalism, as the glue which has bound constitutionalism, republicanism and 
democracy together since the late 18th century, is a fundamental component of the American 
political experiment.  Federalism provides the remedies for the “diseases most incident to 
Republican Government.” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 46) The Founding Fathers “applied for the first 
time theories either previously unknown or deemed inapplicable, they stage[d] for the world a 
spectacle for which nothing in the history of the past had prepared it.” (Tocqueville [1835] 2004, 30)  
The American experiment has continued for over 200 years and we are fortunate to 
consider it in light of that experience. Has the great experiment worked the way that Hamilton and 
Madison thought it would? Does federalism still provide a set of remedies for the republican 
diseases? I observe legislative, functional, managerial and constitutional federalism, each with 
practical benefits for the way American government works today.  
With the exception of constitutional federalism, (Chapter 4.4) the operational forms depart 
from many of the principles of American government. This departure does not indicate a failure in 
the design of the original experiment. I conclude that constitutional federalism is more effective at 
ordering intergovernmental relations and realizing the original terms and conditions of federalism..  
But the sub-experiments of federalism prove effective in a difference sense; they confirm that the 
experiment continues. The terms and conditions of American federalism remain intact no matter 
what operational form the idea takes.  But as different periods of American government face 
different and often unpredictable problems, some of the terms and conditions are overlooked in an 
effort to provide quick solutions.  In The Meaning of American Federalism, Ostrom observes that it is 
“in our anxiety to be modern, that we are apt to neglect the wisdom that has been accumulated 
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through the ages and made available to us as a cultural heritage.” (Ostrom 1994, 52) The wisdom, 
neglected or not, still exists. We will, as long as the experiment continues, be able to recall and 
revisit the original design of American federalism.  “The achievements of the past afford us with the 
capabilities for today and the prospects of tomorrow.” (Ibid. 52) 
The modern presidency influences operational federalism but not imply that the president is 
alone in doing so. The sub-experiments of federalism I observe present different arrangements of 
the same puzzle of intergovernmental relations. I have chosen to examine the puzzle according to 
where each presidency fits. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 70 observes that “energy in the executive is a 
leading character in the definition of good government.” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 341) Just as 
power checks power, and ambition ambition, “the legal and political competence of each unit of 
government is limited in relation to the legal and political competence of other units of 
government.” (Ostrom 2008 [3rd ed.], 79) Operational forms of federalism occur as a result of these 
reciprocal interactions between all units of government during a given administration. These sub-
experiments of federalism, however, depart from the original principles because they alter the 
original “extent and proper structure” (Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 46) of intergovernmental 
interactions.  Ostrom explains that this proper structure, the most necessary remedy for republican 
disease, has changed, because of “the transfer of rule-making authority to executive 
instrumentalities (executive branch).” As the executive gains rule-making authority beyond the 
original terms of the experiment, other units of government (and the people) lose authority. 
The authority of each unit of government (and of the departments contained therein) in the 
American federal system originates from the “great body of the people.” This is “essential to such a 
[republican] government” (Publius [1797-1788]  2003, 182) because “the system of administration 
which Hamilton and Madison envision in the American federal system was to operate in the context 
of a political system in which all units of government were to be fashioned upon principles of self-
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government.”  (Ostrom 2008 [3rd ed.], 77) The people (through the principles of self-government) 
reserve the right to alter the terms and conditions. This right is expressed through processes of 
constitutional decision making which require action by extraordinary decision rules. (Ibid. 78) The 
transfer of authority to executive instrumentalities not only overlooks the proper structure but also 
the principles of self-government. The design requirements of American federalism therefore 
necessitate that through self-government the people “provide remedies against those who usurp 
authority and abuse their public trust and also reform the structure of government so as to maintain 
the essential equilibrium of a system of constitutional rule.” (Ibid. 92)  
 My study of the relationship between the modern presidency and federalism is meant to 
critique the current system of intergovernmental operations not to blame any individual president 
for a failure to meet all the terms and conditions of the original experiment. To hold any one unit of 
the government responsible for instances of ineffective operational federalism would be to overlook 
the multidimensional design requirements of the American republic. Federalism establishes a bond 
of mutual trust between citizens and governments as well as between each level of government and 
thus requires balance in order to best occur. The sub-experiments of federalism I observe represent 
modern instances of imbalance in operation. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s modern constitutional 
federalism illustrates successfully that this balanced bond, grounded in principles of self-
government, can use “processes of conflict and conflict resolution to elucidate information, clarify 
alternatives, stimulate innovation, and extend the frontiers of inquiry to open new potentials for 
human development.”  (Ostrom 1994, 272) The current state and future of the American 
experiment requires that these bonds of mutual trust  are reconsidered and reapplied – not only by 
the government but also by the people.  
Ostrom writes in The Meaning of American Federalism that federalism has a future, perhaps 
just not in America. (Ostrom 1994, 272) But I disagree and believe that the future of federalism will 
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endure within these United States. Sub-experiments of the idea, as I have shown, highlight 
inefficiencies of American government and can stray from original principles of The Federalist. But 
by showing what doesn’t work in practice we move closer to what might. Government itself is a 
reflection of the fallibility of man because “if men were angels, no government would be necessary.”  
(Publius [1787-1788] 2003, 252) We – citizens and government – are fallible and we have erred and 
we may err again in the struggle to meet the terms and conditions of the great experiment. “An 
enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government” (Ibid. 3) will remind us that the 
diseases of our republic, now an epidemic in the current state of intergovernmental confusion, can 
be remedied. We must reapply the experiments’ terms and conditions, re-balance, re-distribute and 
re-assert self-governance.  
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